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COMMERCIAL LAW-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTLANDLORD-TENANT-REMEDIES-PRIVATE ACTION
BY TENANT UNDER MARYLAND'S CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT REQUIRES DEMONSTRATION OF
ACTUAL LOSS OR INJURY, I.E., DIMINUTION IN
RENTAL
VALUE,
IN
ORDER
TO
JUSTIFY
RESTITUTIONARY AWARD OF RENTS PAID FOR THE
LEASE OF UNLICENSED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY.
CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964 (1992).
The General Assembly of Maryland enacted the state's Consumer
Protection Act ("CPA") in 1974' in an effort to "take strong
protective and preventive steps to investigate unlawful consumer
practices, to assist the public in obtaining relief from these practices,
and to prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland."2 In 1976
the legislature broadened the scope of the CPA to include consumer
real estate within its coverage. 3 Ten years later, in Golt v. Phillips,4
the Court of Appeals of Maryland first interpreted the CPA in the
consumer real estate context, concluding that the remedy applicable
to the landlord's violation of the CPA was complete restitution of
all rents paid. s Recently, in CitaraManis v. Hallowell,6 the court of
appeals revisited the issues originally considered in Golt, and concluded that a violation of the local property license ordinance at
issue, in and of itself, was insufficient to warrant restitution of rents
paid. The CitaraManis holding thus scales back the measure of
damages and restricts the effectiveness of the CPA as applied in the
landlord-tenant context.
In late 1987, Tammy and Michael CitaraManis entered into a
lease to rent a Howard County residence from Eustace and Portia
HallowelP The lease ran from November 1, 1987 to October 31,
1988. 8 Thereafter, the CitaraManises and Hallowells orally agreed to
1. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 609, 1974 Md. Laws 2054. The current version of
the CPA appears at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 13-101 to 13-411 (1990
& Supp. 1993).
2. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-103(b)(3) (1990).

Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 907, 1976 Md. Laws 2487.
308 Md. I, 517 A.2d 328 (1986).
See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964 (1992).
Id. at 144, 613 A.2d at 965. The CitaraManises responded to an advertisement
placed in a local newspaper by the Hallowells. Id.
8.Id.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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extend the lease on a month-to-month basis, with a modest increase
in the monthly rent. 9 On April 30, 1989 the CitaraManises vacated
the ptemises. 1o Approximately three months later, the CitaraManises
filed suit against the Hallowells in the Circuit Court for Howard
County, seeking restitution of all rents paid to the Hallowells under
the original lease and its extension. II The complaint alleged that the
Hallowells had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices prohibited by the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. 12 Specifically, the
CitaraManises asserted that the Hallowells violated section 13-301 of
the Commercial Law Article by failing to license the property as
rental property, as mandated by the Howard County Code,13 and by
subsequently failing to reveal the lack of licensure. 14
9. [d. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Hallowell v. CitaraManis, 88 Md. App. 160, 163, 594 A.2d 591, 592 (1991).
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965.
[d. (citation omitted).
The relevant portion of the Howard County Code stated as follows:
SEC. 13.100. HOUSING CODE; INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE.
the Housing Code of Howard County adopted by the board of
county commissioners on December 22, 1964, as amended, is incorporated herein by reference.
SEC. 13.101. ENfORCEMENT AUTHORITY.
(a) The department of public works is hereby given the power
and authority to enter into, inspect and examine all buildings, improvements, real and leasehold property and vehicles of every description, after giving the owner thereof prior written notice of five (5)
days, to ascertain their condition for health, cleanliness and safety.
SEC. 13.102. LICENSING AND FEES.
The director of public works is hereby authorized and empowered
to fix a schedule of fees or charges to cover the cost of inspection
and of the issuance of a rental housing license for leasing, renting or
letting of any buildings or structures, or parts thereof, as dwelling
units for human habitation in Howard County . . . . Fee schedules
for such inspection and licensing services will be approved by the
council by resolution at the recommendation of the director of public
works. No building or structure, or part thereof, shall be leased,
rented or let or subleased, subrented or sublet without first obtaining
a rental housing license from the department of public works and
paying the requisite fee or charge therefor.
SEC. 13.103. PENALTIES.
Any person, firm, corporation, or officer of a corporation- who
violates any provision adopted or enacted pursuant to the authority
of this subtitle shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1000. No
conviction hereunder shall in any manner relieve any person of any
other penalties or the necessity of compliance with all other applicable
rules, regulations and laws.
HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 13.100-103 (1977 & Supp. 1985) (citation
omitted) (current version at HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 13.100-103, -
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Throughout the resulting litigation, the CitaraManises never
alleged that the property failed to meet any of their material expectations regarding habitability, comfort or safety; rather, they admitted·
that they received exactly what they bargained for with respect to
the physical, tangible condition of the property. IS Nevertheless, they
contended that section 13-408 (a) , which authorizes private civil actions "to recover for injury or loss sustained . . . as the result of a
practice prohibited by [the CPA),"16 entitled them to the restitutionary relief requested, regardless of whether the violation had resulted
in corporeal loss or injury Y The court thus faced the challenge of

14.

15.
16.
17.

106, -131 (1977 & Supp. 1994». The CitaraManises stated that they became
aware of the Hallowells' failure to license the property shortly after they
notified the Hallowells of their intention to vacate the premises. CitaraManis,
328 Md. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965.
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. Section 13-301 of the CPA
provides as follows:
§ 13-301. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES DEFINED.
Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any:
(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual description, or other representation of any kind which
has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers;
(2) Representation that:
(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services have
a sponsorship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use,
benefit, or quantity which they do not have;
(ii) A merchant has a sponsorship, approval, status affiliation,
or connection which he does not have;
... or
(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services are
of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model which they
are not;
(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends
to deceive ....
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-301 (1990).
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-408(a) (1990).
CitaraManis, 328 Md .. at 145, 613 A.2d at 965. In its entirety, section 13-408
of the CPA provides as follows:
§ 13-408. ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
(a) Actions authorized. - In addition to any action by the
Division or Attorney General authorized by this title and any other
action otherwise authorized by law, any person may bring an action
to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as a result of a practice
prohibited by this title.
(b) Attorney's fees. - Any person who brings an action to
recover for injury or loss under this section and who is awarded
damages may also seek, and the court may award, reasonable attorney's fees.
(c) Frivolous actions. - If it appears to the satisfaction of the
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striking the proper balance between the equitable treatment of landlords who act in good faith and effective enforcement of the CPA
in protecting the health and safety of the renting pUblic. In holding
for the landlords, the Court of Appeals of Maryland elected not to
penalize them for noncompliance with the CPA that had not, in the
court's judgment, materially damaged the tenants.
This interpretation of the CPA, although not insupportable,
contradicts the arguably "pro-tenant" result reached by the same
court just six years earlier in Golt v. Phillips. IS In addition, the
CitaraManis court's treatment of the tenant's common-law illegal
contract argument deviates from the approach customarily pursued
by the Maryland courts regarding the enforceability of illegal contracts.19 As a result, the court of appeals' ruling jeopardizes the
ability of the state's subdivisions to effectuate the purposes of the
class of regulatory measures implicated in this case.
In Golt v. Phillips, the tenant responded to an advertisement
placed by the landlords for a residential apartment in Baltimore
City.20 After inspecting the apartment and pointing out several conditions that required repair, Mr. Oolt was assured that the deficiencies
would be promptly corrected. 21 When the landlords failed to perform
the requested rep'airs and other necessary maintenance subsequent to
Mr. Oolt's occupation of the premises, Mr. Oolt filed a complaint
with the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community
Development. 22 The resulting inspection by the Department revealed
that the landlords had not obtained the license necessary to rent a
multi-unit dwelling within the city.23 In addition, Mr. Oolt's unit was
plagued with several other city housing code violations, "including
the lack of toilet facilities ... defective door locks, and the lack of
fire exits and fire doors."24 Instead of obtaining the required license
and correcting the code violations, the landlords evicted Mr. Oolt,
who was then forced to obtain ·substitute housing at a higher cost. 2S
The Golt court concluded that the landlords' actions in advertising and renting the unlicensed dwelling constituted "an unfair and

18.
19.
.20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

court, at any time, that an action is brought in bad faith or is of a
frivolous nature, the court may order the offending party to pay to
the other party reasonable attorney's fees.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-408 (1990).
308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986).
See infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
Golt, 308 Md. at 5, 517 A.2d at 330.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 5-6, 517 A.2d at 330.
[d. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330.
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deceptive trade practice," and a clear violation of the CPA.26 Therefore, under section 13-408(a), which defines the available remedy,
Mr. Golt could maintain a private action against the landlords in
order to "recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result
of" the prohibited practice. 27 In addressing the nature of the section
13-408(a) remedy, the Golt court stated the following:
This private remedy is purely compensatory; it contains no
punitive component. Indeed, any punitive assessment under
the CPA is accomplished by an imposition of a civil penalty
recoverable by the State under § 13-410, as well as by
criminal penalties imposed under § 13-411. Thus, in determining the damages due the consumer, we must look only
to his actual loss or injury caused by the unfair or deceptive
trade practices. 28
Having concluded that the actual loss or injury suffered determines
the damages due, the court faced the remaining pivotal question:
What constitutes "actual loss or injury" for which the tenant may
be compensated?
The Golt court evaluated the nature of the Baltimore City
licensing ordinance, and noted that
[i]t is well settled in this State that if a statute requires a
license for conducting a trade or business, and the statute
is regulatory in the sense that it is for the protection of the
public, an unlicensed person will not be able to enforce a
contract within the provisions of that regulatory statute.
Moreover, . . . the unlicensed person will not be able to
recover under quantum meruit, regardless of any unjust
enrichment to the other party; to permit a recovery under
quantum meruit would defeat the efficacy of the regulatory
statute. 29
Relying upon its analysis of the Baltimore City ordinance, the court
recognized that the licensing requirement upon which Mr. Golt's
claim was based was "a model example of a public health and safety
regulation. "30 As a result, the court determined that the landlords
should not be permitted to "retain any benefits from the unlicensed
lease, and [the tenant was entitled to] recover his full damages."31
The court concluded that "Golt's actual loss [was] comprised of
restitutionary and consequential damages. ''32
1993]

26. Id. at 9, 517 A.2d at 332.
27. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-408(a).
28. Golt, 308 Md. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333-34 (citations omitted).

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
Id.

at 13, 517 A.2d at 334.
(emphasis added).
The restitutionary award consisted of all rents paid under the illegal lease.
at 13-14, 517 A.2d at 334.
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In CitaraManis, citing the court of appeals' prior interpretation
in Golt v. Phillips,33 the Circuit Court for Howard County found
that the landlords' failure to inform the tenants that the property
was unlicensed violated the CPA. 34 The circuit court granted the
tenants' motion for summary judgment and directed the landlords
to return to the tenants all rents paid. 3s The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland, reversing the judgment of the circuit court, held that
the CitaraManises failed to establish any housing code violations
within the meaning of the rent escrow statute of the Real Property
Article,36 and consequently suffered no damages recoverable under
section 13-408(a) of the CP AY The court of special appeals also
noted that the CPA violation did not result in any diminution of the
rental value of the property that would justify the restitutionary relief
requested. 38 The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the reversal

33.
34.
35.
36.

308 Md. 1,517 A.2d 328 (1986).
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 146, 613 A.2d at 966.

[d.
The rent escrow statute, § 8-211 of the Real Property Article, imposes upon
residential landlords a duty to correct dangerous defects in their dwelling units.
Subsections (a) and (b) of that section expressly delineate the purposes for
which it was enacted:
(a) The purpose of the section is to provide tenants with a
mechanism for encouraging the repair of serious and dangerous defects
which exist within or as part of any residential dwelling unit, or upon
the property used in common of which the dwelling forms a part.
The defects sought to be reached by this section are those which
present a substantial and serious threat of danger to the life, health
and safety of the occupants of the dwelling unit, and not those which
merely impair the aesthetic value of the premises, or which are, in
those locations governed by such codes, housing code violations of a
non-dangerous nature.
(b) It is the public policy of Maryland that meaningful sanctions
be imposed upon those who allow dangerous conditions and defects
to eXist in leased premises, and that an effective mechanism be
established for repairing these conditions and halting their creation.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211(a), (b) (1988 & Supp. 1993). Subsections
(c) through (0) further define the scope of the section's application and provide
the mechanisms to effect the objectives stated in subsections (a) and (b). See
id. § 8-211(c)-(0) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
37. Hallowell v. CitaraManis, 88 Md. App. 160, 169-70, 594 A.2d 591, 595-96
(1991). As noted by Professor Gilligan and others, the relationship between
the CPA and the Real Property Article has been the source of confusion since
the adoption of the CPA amendments addressing consumer realty. M. Michele
Gilligan, Landlord Beware: Private Actions By Tenants Under the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act, U. BALT. L.F., Fall 1987, at 18-19 (discussing Golt
and citing Comment, Maryland's Consumer Protection Act: A Private Cause
of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices, 38 MD. L. REV. 733, 764
(1979».
38. Hallowell, 88 Md. App. at 170, 594 A.2d at 596. With respect to establishing
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of the trial court, albeit on other grounds. 39 The majority concluded
that the holding of Go/t was based upon facts which "[stood] in
stark contrast with those of the case sub judice"40 and did not
mandate restitution in the instant case.
Notwithstanding the "actual loss or injury" language of the
Go/t opinion,41 the CitaraManises asserted that their unknowing rental
of unlicensed property did constitute "injury or loss" as contemplated
by section 13-408 (a) and the Go/t court's interpretation of that
section.42 In support of their argument, the CitaraManises pointed
to the following language from the unanimous Go/t opinion: "It is
evident that the license fee is charged to support the cost of inspections, and not to raise revenue. Therefore, [the landlords] may not
retain any benefits from the unlicensed lease, and Golt may recover
his full damages. "43 Acknowledging that this language may have left
the impression that the licensure failure itself, rather than the substandard physical condition of the premises, gave rise to the award
of restitution, the CitaraManis majority concluded that the court had
previously "spoke[n] much too broadly" in that portion of the Go/t
opinion. 44
Unlike the tenant in Go/t, the CitaraManises had "not allege[d]
that the house they had rented was unclean, unsafe, uninhabitable
or unsuitable in any regard. "45 The only "damage" that they sustained, therefore, resulted from unknowingly renting unlicensed property. According to the majority, unknowingly renting unlicensed

39.

.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

the measure of damages applicable to actions brought pursuant to § 13-408(a)
of the CPA, the court of special appeals concluded that the situation is no
different than those causes founded in the applicable provisions of the Real
Property Article. Id. The Real Property Article provisions generally focus upon
the dangerous condition of the premises. See supra note 36.
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 164, 613 A.2d at 974. The case was remanded to the
trial court with instructions
to determine whether the tenants are able to prove that they suffered
"actual injury or loss," justifying recovery under § 13-408(a) of the
CPA [according to the "diminution in value" standard], or that the
landlords' loss of all rent would be proportional to the purpose sought
to be achieved by the licensing scheme .
Id. at 164, 613 A.2d at 975.
Id. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
CitaraManis, 3.28 Md. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967 nn.2-3 and accompanying text.
Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. I, 13,517 A.2d 328, 334 (1986) (cited in CitaraManis,
328 Md. at 149-50, 613 A.2d at 967).
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 150, 613 A.2d at 967 ("Because of the obvious actual
loss and damage suffered by the tenant in Golt who paid rent for what proved
to be an uninhabitable apartment, we realize now, for the reasons hereinafter
set forth, that we spoke much too broadly in making the statement just
quoted.").
Id. at 149, 613 A.2d at 967.
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property was not the type of damage intended by the legislature to
be redressed in a section 13-408(a) action. 46 Rather, the majority
concluded that the proper interpretation of section 13-408(a)-as one
section within a comprehensive enactment-evidences the intent of
the legislature to require a showing akin to a diminution in rental
value in order to justify the award of damages. 47
In divining the legislative impetus behind passage of the CPA,
the court benefitted from an express statement of the legislative intent
underlying the measure: "[The CPA] is intended to provide minimum
standards for the protection of consumers in the State."48 To fulfill

46. [d. at 151, 613 A.2d at 968. "It is manifest from the language employed in §

13-408(a) that the General Assembly intended that a plaintiff pursuing a private
action under the CPA prove actual 'injury or loss sustained.''' /d. (citing Golt,
308 Md. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333).
47. See id. at 152-53, 613 A.2d at 968-69.
48. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-103(a) (1990). The statement of intent is
further codified as follows:
.
§ 13-102. DECLARATION OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings. - (I) The General Assembly of Maryland finds
that consumer protection is one of the major issues which confront
all levels of government, and that there has been mounting concern
over the increase of deceptive practices in connection with sales of
merchandise, real property, and services and the extension of credit.
(2) The General Assembly recognizes that there are federal and
State laws which offer protection in these areas, especially insofar as
consumer credit practices are concerned, but it finds that existing laws
are inadequate, poody coordinated and not widely known or adequately enforced.
(3) The General Assembly of Maryland also finds, as a result of
public hearings in some of the metropolitan counties during the 1973
interim, that improved enforcement procedures are necessary to help
alleviate the growing problem of deceptive consumer practices and
urges that favorable consideration be given to requests for increased
budget allocation for increases in staff and other measures tending to
improve the enforcement capabilities or increase the authority of the
[Division of Consumer Protection of the Office of the Attorney
General].
(b) Purpose. - (I) It is the intention of this legislation to set
certain minimum statewide standards for the protection of the consumers across the State, and the General Assembly strongly urges that
local subdivisions which have created consumer protection agencies at
the local level encourage the function of these agencies at least to the
minimum level set forth in the standards of this title.
(2) The General Assembly is concerned that public confidence in
merchants offering goods, services, realty, and credit is being undermined, although the majority of business people operate with integrity
and sincere regard for the consumer.
(3) The General Assembly concludes, therefore, that it should
take strong protective and preventative steps to investigate unlawful
consumer practices, to assist the public in obtaining relief from these
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this objective, the legislature provided alternative avenues through
which those acts prohibited by the CPA are addressed. The CPA
empowers the Division of Consumer Protection of the Office of the
Attorney General (the "Division"), either in response to a complaint
filed by a consumer or upon its own initiative, to investigate allegedly
unfair or deceptive trade practices. 49 Depending upon the circumstances, the Division's investigation may lead to resolution through
dismissal,50 conciliation,51 imposition of a cease and desist order, 52
submission to arbitration,53 or injunction. 54 Sections 13-410 (civil
penalties) and 13-411 (criminal penalties) detail the sanctions applicable to these public enforcement actions. 55
Juxtaposed with the enforcement proceedings conducted by the
Division, section 13-408(a) permits a private action by an aggrieved
consumer. 56 Although the legislature provided, in one comprehensive
measure, alternative means with which to address violations of consumer confidence, the CitaraManis majority concluded that the bases
upon which public enforcement actions proceed are clearly distinguishable from those necessary to sustain private actionsY Evaluating
the language and organization of section 13-408(a), the court of
appeals delineated the distinction as follows:
In a public enforcement proceeding "[a]ny practice prohibited by this title is a violation . . . whether or not any
consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as
a result of that practice." § 13-302. In contrast, a private
enforcement proceeding pursuant to § 13-408(a) expressly
practices, and to prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland.
It is the purpose of this title to accomplish these ends and thereby

maintain the health and welfare of the citizens of the State.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

[d. § 13-102. The General Assembly's direction that "[the CPA] shall be
construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose," id. § 13-105, further
bolsters the sweeping mandate of §§ 13-102 and 13-103.
[d. § 13-204.
.
See id. § 13-401(d).
See id. § 13-402.
See id. § 13-403 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
See id. § 13-404 (1990).
See id. § 13-406.
See id. §§ 13-410, 13-411 (1990 & Supp. 1993). In the case of a "first violation,"

a merchant is subject to a fine of not more than $1000 for each such violation.
[d. § 13-41O(a) (Supp. 1993). Repeat offenders are subject to a fine of not
more than $5000 for each subsequent violation. [d. § 13-41O(b). In addition
to the imposition of a fine, or in the alternative, "any person who violates
any provision of [the CPA] is guilty of a misdemeanor and ... on conviction
is subject to ... imprisonment not exceeding one year .... " [d. § 13-411(a)
(1990).
56. See id. § 13-408 (1990).
57. CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 154, 613 A.2d 964, 969-70 (1992).
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only permits a consumer "to recover for injury or loss
sustained by him as the result of a practice prohibited by
this title." § 13-408(a). Section 13-408(a), therefore, requires
an aggrieved consumer to establish the nature of the actual
injury or loss that he or she has allegedly sustained as a
result of the prohibited practice. 58
Citing the support of commentators,S9 the majority concluded that
"[a] construction of the CPA that would establish § 13-302 as a
benchmark to determine whether a consumer has sustained 'injury
or loss,' within the meaning of § 13-408(a), is both strained and
illogical."60 The majority also asserted that such a construction would
transform section 13-408(a) into a punitive measure61 -a result both
unjustified by its language and unnecessary in light of the express
punitive provisions of sections 13-410 and 13-411. 62 Thus, according
to the majority, comprehensive examination and analysis of the
CP A's structure demonstrate that a private action under section 13408(a) requires a showing of actual injury or loss in order to recover
damages.
In addition to the discussion of the language and structure of
the CPA, the majority engaged in a survey of other state courts'
treatment of similar consumer protection statutes,
and observe[d] that the consumer protection statutes construed therein fall into three general categories: (1) statutes
that require proof of actual damages and in the absence of
such proof award nominal statutory damages; (2) statutes
that explicitly require that an aggrieved consumer be granted
a complete refund; and (3) statutes that explicitly require
actual damages be proven. 63
58. Id. at 152, 613 A.2d at 969.
Id. The following language was quoted by the CitaraManis majority:
Enjoining an activity that has not yet caused actual harm seems
entirely consistent with an important purpose of the Act, to prevent
unfair or deceptive practices. See id. § 13-102(b)(3). It is clearly
contrary, however, to the language of § 13-408 to permit a consumer
a cause of action if no damages have been sustained, and no legitimate
legislative purpose would be served by such a reading. Section 13-302
should be interpreted to pertain to enforcement action by the Attorney
General and the Division of Consumer Protection, and § 13-408 should
be read to control the elements necessary to establish a private cause
of action.
Id. at 153,613 A.2d at 969 (quoting Comment, Maryland's Consumer Protection Act: A Private Cause of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices,
38 MD. L. REV. 733, 739 n.50 (1979» (emphasis in CitaraManis).
60. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 153, 613 A.2d at 969.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 155, 613 A.2d at 970.
59.
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Upon reviewing statutes in each category, the court found the language in Maryland's section 13-408(a) most similar to the type (3)
statute enacted by the Connecticut legislature. 64 As a result, the
majority considered Conaway v. Prestia,6S interpreting the concomitant Connecticut statute in a factual setting identical to the present
case.
Connecticut's statute at issue in Conaway provided that "[a]ny
person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property ...
as a result of ... a [prohibited] method, act or practice ... may
bring an action ... to recover actual damages. "66 Addressing the
issue of damages, the Connecticut court concluded that the injuries
or losses compensable under the quoted portion of the statute were
limited to those that could be "ascertain[ed] with reasonable certainty
[as] the diminution of the rental value occasioned by the defendants'
wrongful conduct. "67 Although the CitaraManis majority acknowledged the notable absence of the word "actual" in the Maryland
CPA,68 it interpreted the Golt opinion as equating "injury or loss"
with "actual damages. "69 Persuaded by the rationale of the Connecticut court, the court of appeals concluded that the "injury or loss"
compensable under section 13-408(a) in both Golt and CitaraManis
was measured by the diminution in value of the property. 70
The design of section 13-408(a) and the majority's conclusions
regarding the underlying legislative intent, present a persuasive argument that the failure to license property in accordance with local
ordinances does not justify the complete restitution of all rents. paid. 71
Nevertheless, Judge Robert M. Bell emphatically argued in dissent
of CitaraManis that the theories of recovery and measure of damages
asserted by the CitaraManises were the same as those advanced and
sustained by the unanimous Galt court. 72 According to the dissent,
the condition of the rental property was not the fulcrum upon which
the restitutio nary award pivoted; to the contrary, the condition of
the premises was immaterial to the Galt holding and the award of

64. Id. at 155·58, 613 A.2d at 970-71.
65. 464 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1983).
66. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 157 n.6, 613 A.2d at 971 n.6 (emphasis added)
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-11Og(a) (1979» (alteration in CitaraManis).
67. Conaway, 464 A.2d at 853.
68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
69. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 157-58, 613 A.2d at 971; see Golt v. Phillips, 308
Md. 1, 12, 517 A.2d 328, 333 (1986).
70. CitaraManis, 329 Md. at 157-58, 613 A.2d at 971.
71. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
72. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 165-68, 613 A.2d at 975-77 (Bell, Robert M., J.,
dissenting). Judge Eldridge joined in Judge Bell's dissenting opinion. Id. at
181, 613 A.2d at 983 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
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damages therein. 73 The simple failure of the landlords to conform to
the requirements of the housing code and the CPA justified the
award of full restitution in Golt. 74 The dissent concluded that an
award of full restitution was the appropriate remedy in CitaraManis,
not only because of the stare decisis import of Golt, but because the
language and result of Golt also carried the tacit approval of the
Maryland General Assembly. 75
Subsequent legislative treatment of the issues presented in Golt
lends credence to the appellants' assertions that the award of full
restitution for a landlord's violation of the CPA was intended-or
at least approved-by the Maryland General Assembly.76 As proof
of the legislature's acquiescence to the holding of Golt, the appellants
noted the introduction and subsequent defeat in committee of House
Bill 391. 77 The bill, which was introduced during the 1989 session as
an amendment to section 8-204 of the Real Property Article, proposed
the following:
(e)(1) Notwithstanding any local ordinance or regulation
requiring the leasing or inspection of single or multi-family
units, a tenant shall pay rent which is due to a landlord if:
(i) The premises were rendered to or provided for the
tenants;
(ii) The premises were otherwise habitable;
(iii) The premises were used and enjoyed by the tenant;
and
(iv) The tenant was under reasonable notice that the
landlord, in rendering or providing such premises, expected to be paid by the tenant.
(2) The amount of rent paid by a tenant who rents a single
or multi-family unit from a landlord who does not comply
with a local ordinance or regulation described in paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall reflect the difference between the
property value of the rented unit and the property value of
a similar unit rented in compliance with the local ordinance
or regulation described in paragraph (1) of this subsection. 78
Public commentary regarding the bill indicates that both its proponents and opponents recognized that it was introduced with the
73. Id. at 169, 613 A.2d at 977 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting) ("The facts,
including those pertaining to the condition of the leased premises, though
detailed in the Golt opinion, played no role in our decision. ").
74. Id. at 168-69, 613 A.2d at 976-77 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 176-81, 613 A.2d at 980-83 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
76. See Brief for Appellant at 12, CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613
A.2d 964 (1992).
77. Id.
78. Md. H.R. 391, Reg. Sess. (1989).
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objective of overruling Golt.79 Following testimony to this effect, the
bill was defeated in the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of
fifteen to six. so This defeat, argued Judge Bell, demonstrates that the
General Assembly "acquiesced ... in the definition given [in Golt]
to 'injury or loss' as used in [section] 13-408 and in the [restitutionary]
remedy ... prescribed for the CPA violation, as well. "SI Given the
legislative history, the dissent maintained that the court had no
latitude under the facts of CitaraManis to reach a result so contrary
to the holding of Golt.S2
As an alternative to the section 13-408(a) action, the CitaraManises argued that "they were entitled to obtain restitution of the
rent they paid during their occupancy of the demised premises because
the rent was paid pursuant to an illegal and unenforceable lease."s3
In this respect, the appellants analogized the lease agreement to
contracts between consumers and persons engaged in occupations for
which the law requires a license. s4 In these licensing cases, the court
1993)

79. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 179, 613 A.2d at 982 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting);
see Brief for Appellant at 12-13, CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613
A.2d 964 (1992); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. at 15-19,
CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 613 A.2d 964 (1992).
One proponent of House Bill 391 wrote to the House Judiciary Committee
that Legal Aid attorneys in Cumberland, Maryland, armed with Golt,
started recruiting tenants who were being evicted for various reasons
and showing them how to recover large damages from landlords over
technicalities with the City's Occupancy [sic] permit process.
Dozens of landlords were sued by tenants for thousands of dollars
because the landlords' permit was [sic] no longer valid. They were
using a court case from Baltimore (Golt vs. Phillips) and the judges
were helpless to rule in an equitable manner because the Maryland
Law was mute on the subject. As a stop gap measure, Cumberland
repealed it's occupancy permit ordinance until a remedy could be
found. We believe House Bill 391 is that remedy.
Letter from Mary C. Miltenberger, representing the Legislation Committee of
the Associated Landlords of Cumberland Area, to the House Judiciary Committee, microfilmed on Md. Gen. Assembly Leg. Hist., H.R. 391, Reg. Sess.
(1989).
80. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 180,613 A.2d at 983 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
81. [d.
82.Id.

83. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158, 613 A.2d at 971. The appellants argued that the
lease was rendered illegal by virtue of the violation of § 13.103 of the Howard
County Code. See supra note 13. As noted by Judge Bell in dissent, "[t]he
majority does not dispute that the lease in this case was illegal, against the
public policy of the State of Maryland, and, hence, unenforceable. Indeed, it
specifically so acknowledges." [d. at 173, 613 A.2d at 979 (Bell, Robert M.,
J., dissenting). That the failure to conform to the Baltimore City housing code
licensing provision rendered the lease therein "illegal" was also acknowledged
in Golt. See Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 13, 517 A.2d 328, 334 (1986).
84. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158, 613 A.2d at 971-72.
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of appeals "has denied a recovery, either on an express contract
theory or on the theory of quantum meruit, sought by one who
rendered services for which payment has not yet been made. "85 If
applied to the case at bar, this common-law illegal contract theory
would weigh in favor of awarding restitution to the former tenants.
At base, the common-law restitution principle urged by the
tenants is analogous to the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit,
under which one who provides valuable goods or services is permitted,
pursuant to a contract implied in law, to recover the value of the
goods or services from the party in receipt. 86 The law permits recovery
in order to extract from the party in receipt of the goods or services
the "unjust enrichment" that would accrue if recovery were prohibited. 87 According to this principle, in the absence of an enforceable
lease, a landlord may recover from the tenant the reasonable rental
value of the occupied premises. 88 Recovery by the landlord is therefore
predicated upon a demonstration that the tenants are unjustly enriched by escaping payment of the reasonable rental value of the
property.
The premise posed by the CitaraManises mirrors the previously
described example: Because the landlords failed to license the property
as required, any rent received unlawfully, and therefore unjustly,
enriches them, to the detriment of the tenants. Restitution of the
rent paid would force the landlords to disgorge the benefits that were
unjustly received. According to the majority, however, the
CitaraManises' restitution argument failed because "the tenants have
received everything that they bargained for, and a necessary element
justifying the remedy of restitution, i.e., unjust enrichment, is lack-

85.Id.

86. See, e.g., McCardie & Akers Constr. Co. v. Bonney, 647 S.W.2d 193, 194
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Quantum meruit is based on a promise implied by the
law that a person will pay reasonable compensation for valuable services or
materials provided at his request or with his approval. ").
87. See, e.g., Department of Envtl. Resources v. Winn, 597 A.2d 281 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1991). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court delineated the doctrine as
follows:
The equitable doctrine of quantum meruit involves a class of obligations imposed by law, regardless of the intention or assent of the
parties for reasons dictated by justice and is based on the concept
that no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should
be unjustly enriched thereby. To avoid such unjust enrichment, the
law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the labor and
materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor.
Id. at 284 n.3.
88. C/. Holliday v. Pegram, 85 S.E. 908 (S.C. 1915) (where rental contract is
rendered unenforceable by the failure of the parties to agree to the amount of
the rent, claim for rent due was properly advanced on quantum meruit grounds).
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ing. "89 The cases cited in the majority opinion in support of this
conclusion90 generally provide that "a defendant, who in good conscience provides services should not be required to return the moneys
received, since in so doing, it would bestow an unjust enrichment
upon the complaining party.' '91 According to the majority, requiring
the landlord to forfeit the rent paid is "'tantamount to civil punishment, "'92 an objective expressly served by other measures in the
CPA.93
In situations where the party seeking recovery lacks a required
license-as in the occupational licensing cases advanced by the appellants as analogous to their case94-permitting the provider of goods
or services to recover their value runs counter to the public interests
preserved in denying restitutionary relief. As noted by Judge Karwacki in the majority opinion, Maryland law provides that
"[u]nenforceability of a contract because of illegality is a function
of the strength of the public policy involved together with the degree
of the violation of that policy under the facts of the case. "95 In
CitaraManis, the majority concluded that "the facts ... on summary
judgment do not present the degree of illegality that triggers application of the rule of the unlicensed occupation cases."96
In drawing the distinction between the occupational licensing
cases and the facts of CitaraManis, the majority determined that,
"[i]n effect, premises and not people are to be licensed" under the
Howard County Code provision. 97 The majority opinion analogized
89. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 159, 613 A.2d at 972.
90. See CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 159-62, 613 A.2d at 972-73 (citing Comet Theatre

91.
92.

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

Enters., Inc. v. Cartwright, 195 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1952); Host v. Gauntlett,
341 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973); Mosley v. Johnson, 453 P.2d
149, 152 (Utah 1969».
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 160, 613 A.2d at 973.
[d. at 160-61, 613 A.2d at 973 (quoting Host v. Gauntlett, 341 N.Y.S.2d 201,
204 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973» (emphasis in Host).
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
The demonstrative cases cited by the court are: S.A.S. Personnel Consultants,
Inc. v. Pat-Pan, Inc., 286 Md. 335, 341, 407 A.2d 1139, 1143 (1979); Harry
Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 293, 265 A.2d 759, 761 (1970); Thorpe
v. Carte, 252 Md. 523,529,250 A.2d 618, 621-22 (1969); Smirlock v. Potomac,
235 Md. 195, 203, 200 A.2d 922, 926-27 (1964); Snodgrass v. Immler, 232
Md. 416, 421-22, 194 A.2d 103, 105-06 (1963); and Goldsmith v. Manufacturers'
Liab. Ins. Co., 132 Md. 283, 286, 103 A. 627, 628 (1918). See CitaraManis,
328 Md. at 158, 613 A.2d at 972.
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158,613 A.2d at 971-72 (citing Schloss v. Davis, 213
Md. 119, 124-25, 131 A.2d 287, 290-91 (1957».
[d. at 162, 613 A.2d at 973; see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 162, 613 A.2d at 973. This statement follows from
the assertion ,by Judge Karwacki that, rather than determining competence as
a service provider, the license here concerned has as its "purpose the identification of premises to be inspected in order to determine compliance with
housing codes." [d.
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the setting of the instant case to that presented in Schloss v. Davis. 98
Judge Karwacki summarized the facts of Schloss as follows:
The plaintiff in Schloss performed what we would now call
construction manager services in the construction of a residence for the owner. In the construction manager's suit on
an oral contract for all of the allegedly promised compensation, the owner defended on the ground, inter alia, that
the construction manager had violated the local building
code by beginning work on the foundation and frame without a building permit. The permit apparently was obtained
when final drawings became available before work progressed beyond the foundation and frame stages. 99
In permitting the construction manager to recover, the Schloss court
noted the following:
It is the general rule that recovery will be denied if a contract
is illegal in purpose or made by a person lacking the legal
qualifications to contract. But there is a recognized exception
where a denial of recovery would impose a penalty out of
all proportion to the public good, particularly where the
violation is not of a serious nature and merely incidental to
the performance of the contract. ... We think the violation
here falls within the exception. loo
According to the CitaraManis majority, awarding restitution to the
CitaraManises would likewise constitute "a penalty out of all proportion to the public good" sought to be preserved by the licensing
requirement. 101 The tenants bargained for safe, healthy, and secure
housing, which, licensed or not, is exactly what they received.
The "premises versus persons" distinction made by the
CitaraManis majority adds an element: previously unacknowledged in
Maryland case law. 102 In addition, this distinction arguably contradicts
98. 213 Md. 119, 124-25, 131 A.2d 287, 290-91 (1957).
99. CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 162, 613 A.2d at 974.
100. [d. at 163, 613 A.2d at 974 (quoting Schloss, 213 Md. at 125, 131 A.2d at
291) (citations omitted).
101. See id.
102. Judge Bell asserts in dissent that the analysis undertaken by the court in Golt,
far from contemplating the distinction now asserted by the majority, was
performed solely with an eye toward determining whether the Baltimore City
ordinance at issue was regulatory or revenue-generating. CitaraManis, 328 Md.
at 170, 613 A.2d at 977 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting); see Golt v. Phillips,
308 Md. I, 12-13, 517 A.id 328, 333-34 (1986). But cf. Harry Berenter, Inc.
v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 265 A.2d 759 (1970). The Berman court noted that
[IJf a statute requiring a license for conducting a trade, business or
profession is regulatory in nature for the protection of the public,
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the court's analogy to, and reliance upon, Schloss. In Schloss, the
defendant argued, on two independent grounds, that the contract for
services was "void for illegality. "103 As one basis for this illegality
argument, the defendant asserted the plaintiff's failure to obtain the
necessary building permits before advancing with construction. This
permit issue was the point on which Judge Karwacki in CitaraManis
drew the analogy to Schloss:
The approval of dwellings under a rental housing licensing
scheme, from a public safety and welfare standpoint, is
more like the approval of plans for the construction of
buildings than the licensing of service occupations. Inasmuch
as the construction manager in Schloss was permitted affirmatively to recover promised compensation, a fortiori, the
Hallowells, on the present record, are not obliged to refund
rent paid. 104
This analogy-linking the permit issue in Schloss to the rental
license at issue in CitaraManis-is persuasive to a point; to consider
it conclusive, however, disregards the very language from Schloss
quoted by Judge Karwacki: lo5 "The contract for supervision was not
illegal per se" as a consequence of the plaintiff's failure to obtain
the required permits. 106 In CitaraManis, however, the lease of the
unlicensed property patently violated the Howard County Code, 107
and was therefore illegal per se. Thus, both the strength of the public
policy at issue in CitaraManis and the degree of the violation exceed
those weighed by the Schloss court. While the conclusion that the
facts of CitaraManis "do not present the degree of illegality that
triggers application of the rule of the unlicensed occupation cases"
may still be tenable,l08 the nature of the violation committed in
1993)

103.
104.
105.
106.

107.
108.

rather than merely to raise revenue, an unlicensed person will not be
given the assistance of the courts in enforcing contracts within the
provisions of the regulatory statute because such enforcement is against
public opinion.
[d. at 293, 265 A.2d 761. Although the general rule, as quoted, refers to "an
unlicensed person," the author is unaware of any Maryland decision preceding
CitaraManis which explicitly emphasizes "person" rather than "unlicensed."
Schloss v. Davis, 213 Md. 119, 124, 131 A.2d 287, 290 (1957).
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 163-64, 613 A.2d at 974.
See id. at 162-63, 613 A.2d at 974.
Schloss, 213 Md. at 125, 131 A.2d at 291. Further, and as also quoted by
Judge Karwacki, see CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 163, 613 A.2d at 974, "[a)t
most, [the contract) was conditioned upon the obtaining of a permit by [the
owner), based on the approval of the architectural drawings which [the owner)
undertook to supply." Schloss, 213 Md. at 125, 131 A.2d at 291.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 162, 613 A.2d at 973; see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
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Schloss, and thus the degree of illegality present, are distinguishably
less severe than their analogous counterparts in CitaraManis.
The Schloss court's analysis of the second basis upon which the
defendant challenged the validity of the contract-whether the supervisor had the license required of general contractors by the Maryland Annotated Code-contemplated the traditional distinction drawn
in the occupational licensing cases: Is the purpose of the licensing
statute or ordinance regulatory or revenue-generating? 109 Speaking
for the Schloss court, Judge Henderson considered and dismissed the
defendant's argument in the span of two sentences:
The contention that Davis had no general contractor's license, as required by Code (1951), Art. 56, Sec. 168, is
without merit. It was noted in Maguire v. State, 192 Md.
615, that this particular license is for revenue and not for
regulation. 110
On this point, therefore, the holding of Schloss, rather than supporting the dismissal of the CitaraManises' complaint, merely conforms to the general rule that distinguishes between revenue-generating
and regulatory statutes, and further strengthens the argument basing
recovery in an analogy to the "unenforceability-due-to-illegality"
principle that prevails in the occupational licensing cases. II I The
property licensing ordinance violated by the Hallowells was, and is,
regulatory, rather than revenue-generating. 112 Thus, on both commonlaw illegal contract bases, the treatment of the licensing issue in
Schloss can be seen, not as justification for denial of the CitaraManises' claim, but as solid grounds of support for complete restitution of all rents paid. 113
109. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; supra note 43 and accompanying
text; supra note 102.
110. Schloss, 213 Md. at 125-26, 131 A.2d at 291.
Ill. Compare supra note 110 and accompanying text with supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
112. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous Baltimore
City ordinance considered by the Golt court).
113. The majority opinion's treatment of the occupational licensing cases ends with
the following:
For the same reasons set forth in this Part IV.B., we spoke too
broadly in Golt to the extent that Golt rests the recovery of rent paid
on the application to the licensing of rental housing of a per se rule
derived from the occupational licensing cases. Golt did not discuss,
or cite, Schloss.
CitaraMan;s, 328 Md. at 164, 613 A.2d at 974. Although Judge Bell, in dissent
in CitaraMan;s, does not specifically address the majority's substantive treatment of Schloss from the same perspective advanced herein, he notes as
"curious" the retrospective use of that case to undermine the unmistakable
restitutionary underpinnings and holding of Golt, a case that Schloss predates
by almost thirty years. Id. at 174, 613 A.2d at 979-80 (Bell, Robert M., J.,
dissenting).
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The CitaraManis majority expressly declined to consider "whether
lack of the required rental housing license, in and of itself and
without regard to the condition of the premises, would be sufficient
to bar a landlord's claim for unpaid rent or for use and occupation. "114 The treatment of the occupational licensing cases in the
majority opinion implies, however, that although rent "voluntarily"
paid may not be recovered by the tenant, the unenforceability of the
lease would preclude the landlord from the award of rent due but
unpaid. lIS Even though this dichotomy arguably hinges upon form
rather than substance, such a holding would be consistent with the
Connecticut Supreme Court's treatment of its analogous consumer
protection statute,1I6 and with those occupational licensing cases
denying recovery to the unlicensed plaintiffs. 1I7
One purpose of the Maryland CPA, implicitly if not explicitly,
is to assist the state's subdivisions in enforcing local property licensure
laws.1I8 The dissenters argue that rather than supporting enforcement
efforts, the interpretation of the CPA's remedy provisions in the
instant case vitiates the economic incentive that, in the wake of Golt
v. Phillips, encouraged residential landlords to comply with local
licensing requirements. 1I9 Instead, the CitaraManis result offers a
114. Id. at 158-59, 613 A.2d at 972.
115. See CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 158-64,613 A.2d at 971-74. The striking deviation

116.

117.
118.

119.

from the pattern is the recovery, in Schloss, by the unlicensed contractor. As
illustrated above, see supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text, the example
of Schloss, rather than demonstrating an exception to the prevailing jurisprudence, conforms to the established distinction between regulatory and revenuegenerating licenses.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the Connecticut
consumer protection statute expressly precludes recovery of rent by the landlord
in such circumstances:
Sec. 47a-5. (Formerly Sec. 47-24a). No RENT RECOVERABLE FOR PERIOD
OF UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION. In any borough, city or town which
requires a certificate of occupancy prior to human habitation of any
building located therein, if any building is occupied in whole or in
part without such occupancy permit, rent shall not be recoverable by
the owner or lessor of the premises for such period of unlawful
occupation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-5 (1979). The Supreme Court of Connecticut reached
the same result as the CitaraManis majority, even in the face of the abovequoted provision. See Conaway v. Prestia, 464 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1983). Neither
the Maryland CPA nor the Maryland Real Property Article contains such a
provision.
See, e.g., Snodgrass v. Immler, 232 Md. 416, 194 A.2d 103 (1963).
See Statement of Mary Gardner, Legal Officer Supervisor, Department of
Housing and Community Development (of Baltimore) before the House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 9, 1989) ("The licensing requirement is essential to the
City's ability to ensure decent housing."), microfilmed on Md. Gen. Assembly
Leg. Hist., H.R. 391, Reg. Sess (1989); supra note 48.
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 175,613 A.2d at 980 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
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disincentive to landlords, making it economical for them to ignore
similar licensing requirements until such time as the lack of licensure
is uncovered. As long as the tenant continues to pay the rent as
provided in the unenforceable lease, the landlord's exposure, in any
civil action initiated by the tenant, is limited to the difference between
the rent received and the actual rental value of the premises for the
period covered by the payments. 120 In response, the majority notes
that such practices more appropriately fall within the purview of the
public enforcement proceedings effected by the CPA, rather than a
section 13-408(a) private civil action.t2 1
As alleged by Judge Bell, the CitaraManis majority's treatment
of the damages question may well hinge on the perceived unfairness
in taking from the landlords that which they seem to have honestly
earned, and conveying upon the tenants a subsequently "unjust
enrichment." 122 The intentions and motivations of the landlords
notwithstanding, the dissenting opinion reasonably points out that,
in addressing the relative equities of the situation, it makes little
sense to expend such considerable effort to aid that party which
failed to comply with the law, and in so failing, created his or her
own liability.123 Nonetheless, under these facts, where one of two
parties may be seen to have been "unjustly enriched," the CitaraManis
holding resolves the issue in a manner consistent with the reasonable
contractual expectations of the parties l24 and arguably in accordance
with the declared spirit of the CPA, although clearly to the financial
detriment of these particular consumers. The battle lines thus drawn, 125
unless and until the legislature chooses to affirmatively address the
issue and enact a contrary result, the holding of CitaraManis has
recast what was the post-Golt sword of the cunning tenant into the
protective shield of those unwary tenants who fall victim to unscrupulous landlords.
Michael B. MacWilliams

120. Id.
121. Id. at 154, 613 A.2d at 969 ("[T]he appropriate means for addressing this
potential [disincentive] problem is through the imposition of civil penalties
under § 13-410, and criminal penalties under § 13-411 of the CPA, not by
transforming § 13-408(a) into a punitive measure.").
122. Id. at 177, 613 A.2d at 981 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 177-78, 613 A.2d at 981 (Bell, Robert M., J., dissenting).
124. This is true only if the "value" associated with the approval of the licensing
authority is entirely discounted.
125. See Galola v. Snyder, 328 Md. 182, 613 A.2d 983 (1992) (reaching same result
on analogous facts with same members of court comprising majority and
dissent).

